Khalumba M., Wünscher T., Wunder S., Büdenbender M., Holm-Müller K.
Kenyan Forest Service Headquarters, Forest Economic Section, Karura Forest, Off Kiambu Road, P.O. Box 30513-00100, Nairobi, Kenya; Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, Bonn, 53227, Germany; Center for International Forestry Research, CIFOR, Rua do Russel, 450, sala 601, Glória, CEP 22.210-010, Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Brazil; Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Bonn, Nussallee 21, D-53115 Bonn, Germany
Khalumba, M., Kenyan Forest Service Headquarters, Forest Economic Section, Karura Forest, Off Kiambu Road, P.O. Box 30513-00100, Nairobi, Kenya; Wünscher, T., Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, Bonn, 53227, Germany; Wunder, S., Center for International Forestry Research, CIFOR, Rua do Russel, 450, sala 601, Glória, CEP 22.210-010, Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Brazil; Büdenbender, M., Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Str. 3, Bonn, 53227, Germany; Holm-Müller, K., Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Bonn, Nussallee 21, D-53115 Bonn, Germany
Cost-effectiveness is an important aspect in the assessment of payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives. In participatory field trials with communities in Western Kenya, we combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with performance-based payments and compared the outcomes with a baseline scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. Procurement auctions were the most cost-effective. The competitive nature of the auction reduced contracting expenses (provision costs), and the result-oriented payments provided additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings, resulting in their improved survival rates (service quantity). These gains clearly exceeded increases in transaction costs associated with conducting an auction. The number of income-poor auction participants and winners was disproportionately high and local institutional buy-in was remarkably strong. Our participatory approach may, however, require adaptations when conducted at a larger scale. Although the number of contracts we monitored was limited and prohibited the use of statistical tests, our study is one of the first to reveal the benefits of using auctions for PES in developing countries. © 2014 Society for Conservation Biology.
cost-benefit analysis; environmental economics; forest management; forestry policy; statistical analysis; survivorship; transaction cost; Kenya; comparative study; cost benefit analysis; economics; environmental protection; forestry; Kenya; procedures; Conservation of Natural Resources; Cost-Benefit Analysis; Forestry; Kenya